

A Distributed Calculus for Role-Based Access Control

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joint work with D. Gorla and V. Sassone

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RBAC

Why: Role-Based Access Control is attracting increasing attention because:

- it reduces complexity and cost of security administration;
- permission's management is less error-prone;
- it is flexible (rôle's hierarchy, separation of duty, etc.);
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
Our work: Formalize the behaviour of concurrent and distributed systems under security policies defined in a RBAC fashion, similar to

- the types developed in $D\pi$ and $KLAIM$ to implement discretionary access control
- the types developed for Boxed Ambients to implement mandatory access control

Contents

- the *RBAC96* model
- a *formal framework* for concurrent systems running under a RBAC policy: an extension of the π -calculus
- a *type system* ensuring that the specified policy is respected during computations
- a *bisimulation* to reason on systems' behaviours
- some useful applications of the theory:
 - finding the '*minimal*' *schema* to run a given system
 - *refining a system* to be run under a given schema
 - *minimize the number of users* in a given system.

The Basic RBAC model



The starting point: π -calculus

Concurrent processes communicating on *channels*.

PROCESSES: $P, Q ::= a(x).P \mid u\langle v \rangle.P \mid [u = v]P \mid (\nu a : R)P$
 $\mid \mathbf{nil} \mid P|Q \mid !P$

The Syntax of our Calculus

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USER SESSIONS: $r\{P\}_\rho$

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Channels are **allocated to users** to enable a distributed implementation

Dynamic Semantics

It is given in the form of a *reduction relation*

Communication:

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RBAC schema

- Permissions are *capabilities* that enable process actions. Thus, $\mathcal{A} \triangleq \{R^\uparrow, R^\?, R^\downarrow\}_{R \in \mathcal{R}}$ is the set of permissions.

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- Permissions are *capabilities* that enable process actions. Thus, $\mathcal{A} \triangleq \{R^\uparrow, R^?, R^\downarrow\}_{R \in \mathcal{R}}$ is the set of permissions.
- In our framework, the *RBAC schema* is a pair of finite relations $(\mathcal{U}; \mathcal{P})$, such that

$$\mathcal{U} \subseteq_{\text{fin}} (\mathcal{N}_u \cup \mathcal{C}) \times \mathcal{R} \qquad \mathcal{P} \subseteq_{\text{fin}} \mathcal{R} \times \mathcal{A}$$

An Example

A banking scenario:

- two users, the client r and the bank s
- cashiers are modelled as channels c_1, \dots, c_n of user s
- the rôles available are `client` and `cashier`.

$$\begin{aligned} r\{\mathbf{role\ client}.enqueue^s\langle r\rangle.dequeue(z).z\langle req_1\rangle.\dots.z\langle req_k\rangle.z\langle stop\rangle.\mathbf{yield\ client}\}\rho \quad || \\ s\{(\nu free)(!enqueue(x).free(y).dequeue^x\langle y\rangle \quad | \quad \Pi_{i=1}^n free^s\langle c_i^s\rangle \quad | \\ \Pi_{i=1}^n !c_i(x).([x = withdraw_req] \langle \mathbf{handle\ withdraw\ request} \rangle \quad | \\ [x = dep_req] \langle \mathbf{handle\ deposit\ request} \rangle \quad | \dots \quad | \\ [x = stop]free^s\langle c_i^s\rangle))\}\rho' \end{aligned}$$

Static Semantics - Types

- The syntax of types:

$$\begin{array}{ll} \textit{Types} & T ::= UT \mid C \\ \textit{User Types} & UT ::= \rho[a_1 : R_1(T_1), \dots, a_n : R_n(T_n)] \\ \textit{Channel Types} & C ::= R(T) \end{array}$$

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- $\Gamma; \rho \vdash_r^{\mathcal{P}} P$ states that P respects Γ and \mathcal{P} when it is run in a session of r with rôles ρ activated
- A typing environment is a mapping from user names and variables to user types that respects the assignments in \mathcal{U}

Static Semantics - The Type System

An example: performing input actions.

$$\frac{\begin{array}{l} \text{(T-INPUT)} \\ \Gamma \vdash a : R(T) \quad R \in \mathcal{P}(\rho) \quad \Gamma, x \mapsto T; \rho \vdash_r^{\mathcal{P}} P \end{array}}{\Gamma; \rho \vdash_r^{\mathcal{P}} a(x).P}$$

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Type Safety: Let A be a well-typed system for $(u; \mathcal{P})$. Then, whenever $A \equiv (\nu \widetilde{a^r : R})(A' \parallel r\{b(x).P\}_\rho)$, it holds that

- either $b^r : S \in \widetilde{a^r : R}$ and $S^? \in \mathcal{P}(\rho)$,
- or $b^r \notin \widetilde{a^r}$ and $S^? \in \mathcal{P}(\rho)$, where $\{S\} = u(b^r)$

The Example Again

- The banking scenario again:
 - now each available operation is modelled as a different channel (*wdrw* = withdraw, *opn* = open account, *cc* = credit card request)
 - the communication among different channels requires different rôles
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LTS Semantics

- The labels of the LTS are derived from those of the π -calculus:

$$\mu ::= \tau \mid a^r n \mid a^r n : R \mid \bar{a}^r n \mid \bar{a}^r n : R$$

- the LTS relates *configurations*, i.e. pairs $(\mathcal{U}; \mathcal{P}) \triangleright A$ made up of a RBAC schema $(\mathcal{U}; \mathcal{P})$ and a system A .
- Example:

$$\frac{\text{(LTS-F-INPUT)} \quad \mathcal{U}(a^r) = \{R\} \quad R^? \in \mathcal{P}(\rho) \quad n \notin \text{dom}(\mathcal{U})}{(\mathcal{U}; \mathcal{P}) \triangleright r\{[a(x).P]\}_\rho \xrightarrow{a^r n : S} (\mathcal{U} \uplus \{n : S\}; \mathcal{P}) \triangleright r\{[P[n/x]]\}_\rho}$$

Bisimulation Equivalence

- We can define a standard bisimulation over the LTS
- **(Bisimulation)** It is a binary symmetric relation \mathcal{S} between configurations such that, if $(D, E) \in \mathcal{S}$ and $D \xrightarrow{\mu} D'$, there exists a configuration E' such that $E \xrightarrow{\hat{\mu}} E'$ and $(D', E') \in \mathcal{S}$. *Bisimilarity*, \approx , is the largest bisimulation.
- the bisimulation is adequate with respect to a standardly defined (typed) barbed congruence.

Some Algebraic Laws

- if an action is not enabled, then the process cannot evolve:

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- the user performing an output action is irrelevant; the only relevant aspect is the set of permissions activated when performing the action:

$$r\{b^s\langle n \rangle.\mathbf{nil}\}_\rho \approx t\{b^s\langle n \rangle.\mathbf{nil}\}_\rho$$

Finding the “Minimal” Schema

- **Goal:** to look for a ‘minimal’ schema to execute a given system A while maintaining its behaviour w.r.t. $(\mathcal{U}; \mathcal{P})$
- **Algorithm:**
 - fix a *metrics* (number of rôles in the schema, permissions associated to each rôle, etc.)
 - define the set $CONF_A = \{(\mathcal{U}'; \mathcal{P}') \triangleright A : (\mathcal{U}'; \mathcal{P}') \text{ is a RBAC schema}\}$ of configurations for A
 - partition $CONF_A$ w.r.t. \approx and consider the equivalence class containing $(\mathcal{U}; \mathcal{P}) \triangleright A$
 - choose the minimal schema according to the chosen metrics

Refining Systems

- **Goal:** to add rôle activations/deactivations within a system in such a way that the resulting system can be executed under a given schema $(\mathcal{U}; \mathcal{P})$
- we want a rôle to be active only when needed
- the refining procedure replaces any input/output prefix α occurring in session $r \{ \cdot \cdot \cdot \}_\rho$ with the sequence of prefixes $\text{role } \vec{R} . \alpha . \text{yield } \vec{R}$ where \vec{R} is formed by rôles assigned to r , activable when having activated ρ and enabling the execution of α
- the refining procedure adapts the type system
- **Improvement:** we can give an algorithm to minimize the number of these actions added

Relocating Activities

- **Goal:** to transfer a process from one user to another without changing the overall system behaviour, in order to minimize the number of users in a system
- it is possible to infer axiomatically judgments of the form:

$$(u; \mathcal{P}) \triangleright r\{P\}_\rho \approx (u; \mathcal{P}) \triangleright s\{P\}_\rho$$

This judgment says that the process P can be executed by r and s without affecting the overall system behaviour.

- Thus, the session $r\{P\}_\rho$ can be removed. If no other session of r is left in the system, then r is a useless user and is erased.

Conclusion

- We have defined a **formal framework** for reasoning about concurrent systems running under an RBAC schema;
- a number of papers deal with the specification and verification of RBAC schema;
- **Future Works:**
 - extend the framework to deal with more complex RBAC models;
 - prove that bisimilarity is complete for barbed congruence;
 - study information flow in terms of RBAC?

<http://www.dsi.unive.it/~dbraghin/publications.html>